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BOOK REVIEWS
ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEDURE LEGISLATION IN THE STATES.

By Ferrell

Heady. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1952. Pp. 137. $1.00.
In this modest but incisive study Professor Heady, who teaches political science at the University of Michigan and is Assistant Director of
its Institute of Public Administration, makes an informative and valuable contribution to the literature of administrative procedure. His
monograph in pamphlet form embodies not only the results of careful
study of statutory texts, judicial decisions and official regulations, but
also data gathered at first-hand in an on-the-scene survey of five representative states possessing administrative procedure legislation and
one state, Oklahoma, in which determined efforts to secure the passage
of such legislation are continuing. The other states are California,
Michigan, Missouri, North Dakota, and Wisconsin.
Professor Heady begins his study with a brief account of the
movement toward state administrative procedure legislation. He emphasizes especially the Model Act of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, to which he refers for comparison
throughout his text. In his final chapter he states his conclusions as to
the advantages and difficulties of the legislation he has investigated
and the merit, or lack of it, of certain proposals for additional enactments which he has encountered. He is aware of passing judgment
to a large extent on the efforts of lawyers to deal with matters of professional importance, as to which they have taken the initiative. He
rightly asserts the justifiability of such an appraisal "with a questioning
and critical eye" by one who looks at the issues from the standpoint
of maintaining effective regulatory administration.
The author's objectivity and ability to analyze the questions presented are admirable.' "Administrative procedure," he emphasizes,
"must strike a balance between the objective of protecting individuals
from arbitrary action by administrative agencies and the equally important goal of expeditious execution of public policy.... The problem
is. of equal concern to the lawyer and the public administrator....One question has been whether general administrative procedure legislation is wise or whether the regulation of procedure should be by
1. Professor Heady's previous inquiries into administrative procedure and

allied problems include his article, Administrative Rule-Making Under Section
701(e) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 10 GEo. WAsif. L. Rav. 406 (1942),
and studies as a member of the staff of the Commission on the Organization

of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission). See his
Comment, The Operation of a Mixed Commission, 43 Am. POL. SCI. REv. 940
(1949).
2. P. 3.
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separate statutes in the several fields of administration. As to this,
Professor Heady concludes that "the comprehensive procedural statutes enacted in the four states of North Dakota, California, Wisconsin,
and Missouri ... have had in the balance a beneficial effect in each
state"' but he also believes "there is a point of diminishing returns
in imposing uniform procedural requirements," which there is danger
of passing if pending proposals for additional legislation in Missouri
and Michigan should be adopted.'
In the body of his study Professor Heady treats successively, with
reference to each of the states covered, the various aspects of rule
making, adjudication and judicial review which are dealt with in the
statutes. He sets forth comparatively the provisions of the various
enactments and of the Model Act, states the practice under the existing
provisions as it is revealed in published sources or was disclosed in the
course of his personal inquiries and brings out the successes and the
unsolved problems that have emerged in the several jurisdictions.
The result is a panorama of the whole which, like an infra-red aerial
photograph, also supplies a wealth of detail. No similar body of information is available elsewhere.'
The most noteworthy development reviewed by Heady is the establishment of the California Division of Administrative Procedure and
that Division's maintenance of a panel of hearing officers for voluntary
use by state agencies in formal proceedings and its publication of a
loose-leaf California Administrative Code and supplemental Administrative Register. By these measures California has led the way in
attempts to make administrative regulations genuinely available to
those concerned with them and in efforts to provide effectively for
the orderly, responsible conduct of administrative hearings. Professor
Heady reports that the publication system is beneficial despite its
elaborateness and somewhat high cost, since it not only distributes
over three hundred full sets of regulations throughout the state but
results in the economical distribution of larger numbers of subjectmatter portions and reprints of the regulations. The panel of hearing
officers has won its way to increasing use despite the discouragement,
usual in less spectacular efforts at improving administration, of inadequate salaries. The success that has been achieved has resulted
in large part from the existence of an over-all Division and the work
of its able director. The Division watches over the whole of adminis3. P. 121. The Michigan legislation which was studied was not of the "comprehensive" variety, but included only provisions for the preparation and
publication of regulations.
4. P. 122.
5. Nathanson, Recent Statutory Developments in State Administrative Law,
33 Iowa L. REv. 252 (1948), is an excellent summary and commentary with respect to the state statutes in existence at its date, embracing those covered by
Heady and others as well; but it does not purport to deal with actual experience
under these laws.
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trative procedure in the state and fends for its needs in periodical
reports and in the efforts to bring about improvement, which it makes.
Even though the example of this experience is applicable specifically
to the Federal Government and the minority of big states,' more
largely than to the states as a whole, its lesson that continuous, informed attention to the problems of administrative procedure by an
official charged with responsibility brings good results, is applicable
everywhere.
Requirements for the filing and publication of regulations are frequently a problem, Professor Heady finds. Interest in securing notice
of the regulations and access to them is far less widespread than might
be supposed. The result is that poorly maintained files go unchallenged
and evasion of statutory waiting periods before regulations are to
become effective is often practiced. The principal means of evasion is
the device of branding regulations as "emergency" measures, which
are exempted by statute from the waiting period requirement. The
success of methods of publication is largely a matter of economics. In
addition to California, only Michigan and Wisconsin, among the states
studied, are carrying out publication requirements. In execution the
publication plans have left a good deal to be desired; but in both
states improvements, which seem possible within the limits of available resources, are contemplated.
Unlike Indiana and Ohio which require hearings in connection with
the adoption of regulations, the states studied follow the Model Act by
omitting mandatory rule-making procedures, except California. There
notice and an opportunity for interested persons to submit statements
in writing or orally, with an exception for emergency regulations,
are prescribed.
As to adjudication, procedural requirements similar to those of the
Model Act are included in the statutes of California, Missouri, North
Dakota and Wisconsin. Those of the California act apply to designated
agencies, while those in the other states apply to "contested cases" or
"formal proceedings," as defined, occurring in all agencies. Only one
serious problem appears to have arisen with respect to the application
of these requirements, and that relates to the always-troublesome
question of the methods of decision by agency heads in a case where
not they but a hearing officer has heard the evidence and has rendered
a report or made an initial decision. A tendency has arisen in Cali6. The federal Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure
recommended unanimously in 1941 that an Office of Federal Administrative
Procedure be established and be given research and advisory functions, together with the duty of appointing hearing examiners upon nomination by the
agencies and of passing upon their removal for cause if a hearing by the Office
should be demanded. FINAL REPORT 193-94, 196-97, 221-23, 237-39 (1941). Although other recommendations of the Committee, including many emanating
from its "minority," have been accepted, this central one has never been
adopted or, it would seem, seriously considered.
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fornia to require the agency heads to consider the whole record if the
proposed decision of the hearing officer is not accepted in its entirety,
even where the only disputed question is whether that decision recommends an adequate period of suspension of a licensee for violations
of law. Professor Heady soundly suggests that the provision of the
Model Act placing the burden on the parties to point to the portions
of the record that bear on the problem before the agency heads offers
a sound solution. He also endorses Professor Nathanson's suggestion
that, as has been done in California, the practice be adopted of not requiring the hearing officer's proposed decision to be submitted to the
parties in advance if the agency is accepting it as its own. Heady goes
along with the requirement that decisions adverse to a private party
be in writing and accompanied by findings of fact and conclusions of
law, although this requirement may at times be burdensome and goes
beyond judicial practice in most trial courts. As this requirement
indicates, there is a tendency of administrative procedure legislation
to expand the necessity for written documents; and it is significant
that, as Heady notes, the Wisconsin motor vehicle transportation act
was amended in 1947 at the behest of the regulated interests to dispense with the administrative procedure act's requirement of written
reports by hearing officers in licensing cases and to compel decisions
within sixty days in such cases. Obviously the line between methods
which tend to insure open, precise administrative reasoning and those
adapted to the efficient dispatch of business is difficult to draw.
As respects judicial review, Heady notes the inadequacy of some of
the new state legislation to establish a uniform, simple form of review
proceeding, such as has been forcefully advocated.' In California the
reasons are constitutional; elsewhere they reside in reluctance to
supersede familiar methods or to dispense with a broader scope of
review in some existing proceedings than would prevail in a new,
over-all form of review. In North Dakota and Wisconsin, however,
uniformity has been achieved. In the former state the legislation has
been construed in accordance with prior practice to provide a broader
scope of review than the familiar "substantial evidence" formula produces. In Wisconsin the scope of review has been extended by the
administrative procedure act in accordance with that formula, as compared to a more restricted scope previously in effect with respect to at
least some classes of administrative decisions.
At various points in
proposals which would
administrative agencies
authority. In Missouri
7. DAWS, ADwnsTAn S

his discussion Professor Heady takes note of
impose stricter procedural requirements upon
than at present, or would otherwise limit their
a bill to "judicialize" the hearings in formal

ET,
LAw

718-19 (1951).
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proceedings by detailed provisions for pleadings, evidence and other
elements of procedure was vetoed by the governor in 1950. In California and Michigan proposals have been made to give considerable
finality to the decisions of hearing officers who would be on central
panels, as against agency revision. Such proposals would in effect elevate hearing officers to the status of independent tribunals and would
require the agencies to submit to the determinations of officers who
would not be answerable to them or be especially versed in the matters
with which the agencies are concerned. The advantages of agency
initiative and specialization, which are among the principal reasons
for resorting to administrative processes, would thus be lost to a large
extent. There seems to be no justification for such a development, except possibly in situations, which are rare or nonexistent in state
administration, where financial sanctions are to be imposed for defined
misconduct. As Heady points out, such proposals have less to recommend them than those to establish specialized quasi-judicial tribunals,
split off from regulatory agencies, with decision-making powers. The
President's Committee on Administrative Management made such a
proposal in 1937; but the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure and the Hoover Commission later rejected it.
Professor Heady also deplores a peculiar type of legislativecommittee review of administrative regulations which has arisen in
Michigan. Under statutory interpretations by the attorney general,
this review creates the possibility of a paralysis of rule-making - a
possibility which has been realized in at least one instance, despite
agency efforts to cooperate. The review committee proceedings, moreover, take on the aspect of a judicial trial, with pleadings and issues.
This particular form of supervision of agency action has boomeranged,
since there is evidence that the agencies, in order to avoid it, have
tended to refrain from announcing their policies in filed regulations,
thus depriving the public of the guidance to which it is entitled.!
The real or threatened extremes to which administrative procedure
legislation can go may justly be charged to an excess of zeal on the
part of lawyers eager to protect the interests of private parties who
are subject to administrative regulation. The possible baneful effects
of such zeal must be overcome. So far they have been largely avoided;
for the activities of the bar as they have emerged in the measures
Professor Heady reviews have on the whole produced good results.
This record is encouraging, for it gives promise that the jungle of state
administrative processes will actually be tamed. Professor Heady's
8. At its last session the Michigan legislature adopted an administrative procedure act patterned after the Model Act. It omits the stricter requirements as
to hearing officers' decisions previously advocated and leaves the previous form
of review of administrative regulations undisturbed. Mich. Pub. Acts (1952)
No. 197.
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study contains an effective account of the effort so far made, accompanied by significant suggestions for the future. It is definitely worthy
of attention by all who have an interest in its subject.
RALPH

F. FUCHS*

BAR EXAMiNATIONS AND REQUIBEMENTS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR.
Prepared by Committee on Bar Examinations and Requirements for
Admission to the Bar for the Survey of the Legal Profession. Colorado
Springs: Shepard's Citations. 1952. Pp. xvii, 498. $5.00.
This book is a part of The Survey of the Legal Profession which is
being conducted under the auspices of the American Bar Association.
It consists of 12 articles written by experts in the field of bar examinations and admission to the bar. These articles have been published
previously as they were completed in the Bar Examiner and in the
American Bar Association Journal. There has been added a report of
the consultant which summarizes the articles and culminates in 32
specific recommendations.
This work is a valuable contribution to the administration of justice.
For, by and large, our system of justice will be no better than those
whose duty it is to administer it. These are the lawyers and judges
who have been admitted to the practice of law.
All the articles are carefully prepared, thoroughly documented
and ably presented. All features of bar examinations and requirements for admission to the bar are thoroughly covered. The practices
and requirements of the various states are set out and there is made
available information of what other states are doing. This is valuable
for purposes of study and comparison and should result in the best
practices being adopted by all the states and in the discard of practices which have proven inadequate. All of those directly concerned
with the education, examination and admission to practice of applicants for law licenses will profit by a careful study and analysis of
the material presented in this book.
A brief study of the system used in Tennessee and comparison with
practices in other states will be made. The 32 recommendations of
the consultant serve as a good focal point for this approach.
Five of the recommendations are not applicable to state practices.
Of the remaining 27, Tennessee complies with ten. Tennessee does
require three years of pre-legal education before permitting students
to begin the study of law, and does not accept private study, correspondence school, law office training or recognize the "diploma
privilege." Tennessee does stress character qualification and uses the
* Professor of Law, Indiana University.
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services of the National Conference of Bar Examiners in checking
the character of out-of-state attorneys. The Knoxville bar is to be
highly commended on its practice of personal interviews with all
applicants referred to it for investigation. Tennessee does use
the essay type of questions, without labeling as to subject matter;
re-grades papers in borderline cases; and, limits to three the number of
times an applicant may take the examination.
Room for considerable study and analysis lies in the 17 recommendations with which Tennessee is not in compliance. Some of these
will be discussed briefly. On the matter of selection of bar examiners,
these are appointed by the Supreme Court. The statutory term is
three years, but in practice this is disregarded and the term actually
is for life, unless an examiner resigns. The three-year term is satisfactory, and a reappointment for another term would be proper. But
for best results, and in order to provide new ideas and enthusiasm,
there should be rotation in office. The list of subjects for the examinations should be revised. At least such subjects as taxation, trade
regulations, administrative law and labor law should be added. This
would make it feasible for the examiners to include optional questions on the examination.
The bar examination, its form and content, is ,he cornerstone of
the entire admissions system. The questions should test the applicants
ability to reason logically, to make an accurate legal analysis and to
demonstrate a thorough knowledge of the fundamental principles
of law and their application. This is much easier to say than it is
to do. Preparation of good bar examination questions is a science,
or perhaps an art. Each question and answer should be thoroughly
briefed and analyzed before it is accepted. This takes time, and, on the
average, it requires a minimum of 24 hours work to prepare a good
question. This is a work for experts and for those trained in the
preparation of questions. Several states have solved the problem by
employing experts to prepare the questions, or by obtaining the services of out-of-state law professors to prepare the questions. And, it
has been suggested that a standard bar examination be made available for use on a nation-wide basis. Questions prepared by practicing
lawyers are apt to test only the information, memory or experience of
the applicant. Lack of time alone prevents the practicing attorney
from being able to prepare suitable questions.
A thorough statistical study should be made after each examination and the results published. This is valuable in checking errors and
in assisting law schools in making changes where weak spots develop.
There should be close cooperation between the bar examiners and
the law schools of the state, with regular meetings between the examiners and the deans of the law schools. This would permit each group
to appreciate the problems of the other group and would prevent the
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unhappy situation of the law schools teaching the students one thing
and the examiners examining them on something else.
Serious study should be given to the problem of requiring an
apprenticeship after the applicant passes the bar examination and
before being granted a license. Some states do require this period of
practical training. The difficulties are many, but the objectives to be
achieved are most desirable. The plain truth is that on admission to
practice law the neophyte lawyer is not qualified to represent his
clients. Practical experience cannot be provided in the law schools, and
a period of apprenticeship seems to be the best solution to the problem.
All of the suggestions and recommendations found in this volume
are the result of long and careful study made by persons familiar with
the problems and qualified to undertake the task. They deserve consideration by all who are interested in the processes and practices
concerned with the examination and admission of persons to the
practice of law.
WILL ALLEN WILKERSON*

TRIAL JUDGE.

By Bernard Botein. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1952.

Pp. 337 $5.00.
Trial Judge is the graphic story of one whose training for the judiciary had its beginning in an incident of his boyhood, when, because
of a broken wrist, he became the umpire in a baseball game, instead
of a player on one of the two participating teams. On a close play,
he had to decide, in a tied game, whether a batter on his team was out
at first base, making the third out and thus nullifying a run by a baserunner from third to home plate. After a moment's hesitation, of which
the author says neither umpire nor judge should ever be guilty, he
ruled the batter out, much to the resentment of his own teammates.
This experience, coupled with further umpiring that summer, taught
him the rudiments of his duty later as a judge "to don that aspect of
neutrality and incuriosity shared in common by umpires and judges,"
and to decide close questions of fact objectively, so that he may leave
the courthouse "with his self-respect unimpaired."
As a judge he soon fortified his earlier conviction that the dominant
concern in the trial of cases is that the jury receive a full, neutral,
objective presentation of the facts and an intelligent, understandable
and uncomplicated exposition of the law in the judge's charge and be
protected from extraneous evidence tending to obscure the issues.
Upon his first trial, he agonized painfully in preparing his charge,
Member of the Chattanooga bar; Vice-President, Board of Law Examiners of
Tennessee.
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which he found later to be "too precise, too legalistic" and lacking in
simplicity. He learned "the hard way, to avoid turgidity and formidable terms."
He demonstrates that the court process is a "highly sophisticated
and disciplined enterprise," having for its purpose the reconstruction
of the true factual situation existing within a prior fixed period of time,
under governing applicable procedural rules, presenting "endless vistas
of epistemological and metaphysical problems." He compares former
trials by ordeals with the present day system under which trials are,
in their essence, searches for the truth, and comments that, though
the result of the quest may not always be all that we could wish, we
have at least achieved "resolution of conflict without resorting to
force." He believes that, in grappling for verity, the judge, with a keen
eye on propriety, may himself put to a witness questions designed to
lead to the truth, remembering always that a judge must first search
the facts, then the law, and lastly his soul.
He delineates the frailties of observation, perception and memory
of all witnesses, including trained scientists, the treacherous uncertainty of the vicious or hostile witness and the lack of reliability
inherent in the accomplice's story, and enlivens his comments with
appropriate stories illustrating his points. He advises the reader of
the reasons for such rules as the exclusion of hearsay, speculative
and opinion evidence and conclusions of witnesses, explaining that
they are designed to the end that he who hears the trial may learn
the truth. He has no quarrel with Wigmore's appraisal of crossexamination as "the great and permanent contribution of the AngloAmerican System of law to improved methods of trial procedure,"
or as "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth," but would add the qualification, "within the limiting boundaries of a judicial trial." He hails the lessening of outbursts by lawyers
in cross-examination and their vicious browbeating of witnesses and
welcomes the tendency toward "less flowery" presentation as well
as less "Olympian," "Mid-Victorian" rhetoric, not only in trial lawyers'
courtroom conduct but also in judges' opinions.
The author believes that, though the tenor of trials has changed,
"there is still a great deal of grandeur about the good trial lawyer,"
which, however, arises no longer from thunderous harangues but is
largely of the sort "that clothes the person of a good surgeon." This, he
believes, is because it has come to be recognized that success at trial
results almost entirely from "thorough, painstaking preparation"
rather than from "brilliant coups in the courtroom."
The Justice has confidence in trials by jury and high respect for the
collective "shrewdness of a jury." He recognizes that some believe that
a "trained and experienced judge, unlike most jurors, will hew to the
line of the relevant and not be led astray by the extraneous," but
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observes that a busy judge who reviews steadily a passing parade
of varied causes may become "grooved" and fail to "bring to each
case the eager, fresh consideration of a jury." He thinks it not unlikely that any judge may involuntarily store up in his mind subconscious impressions of certain expert witnesses, certain lawyers or
certain prevalent practices, thus unintentionally bringing to bear upon
his decision matters not in evidence, a procedure which a jury must
be told that it may not employ. If our attitudes have frozen hard, he
insists, "we may be unfair to an honest claimant." All in all, he finds
it somewhat difficult to choose between "the initial skepticism of
judges and the initial gullibility of jurors." Though he recognizes
certain infirmities of the jury system, he has found that it retains
vigor. On the other hand, he believes that the trial too often "operates
as a bottleneck and too often throttles production of the facts." In
other words, the methods for and rules governing production of facts
are, in his opinion, far inferior to the substantive law defining rights
and liabilities. In this respect he follows the postulate of Gellhorn:
"Procedural forms are not fetishes. They are means to ends."'
He avers that a high percent of reversals is not decisive of a judge's
capacity, citing as an example the unusually large proportion of reversals of one of New York's ablest judges, to whom, because of his
ability, more than his share of difficult involved cases were assigned,
and who "did not fear to pioneer in thoughtful decisions." "High
batting averages," therefore, he considers unsafe yardsticks.
He reflects a nice sense of discrimination in his discussion of a
lawyer's duty to his client and that to the court and argues convincingly
that any doubt as to a client's guilt is not for the advocate to resolve
but for the court or jury, but warns that conscious contribution on
the part of the lawyer to the commission of perjury can never be
condoned.
He reiterates that a judge must avoid partisanship, keep his temper
and refrain from being goaded by a boorish lawyer into explosive sputtering rage. Impartiality and honesty, desirable in everyone, are absolutely essential in judges. The public may justly expect differences
in their abilities and temperments but not in their characters. Though
polls have indicated that some 76 percent of those participating believe
judges honest, the author finds no solace in the figures but considers
it disturbing that "so substantial a minority" distrusts the integrity of
the judiciary. He himself is convinced that the percentage of judges
inspired by corrupt motives, is an extreme minimum. He recognizes,
however, that occasionally venal characters will show their faces, some
of whom will attempt to intervene with the judge and to influence him.
He sadly observes that even some otherwise upright citizens are not
above employing a lawyer who, they think, "enjoys the good will
1. GELLHoRN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEEDINGS

51 (1941).
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of the judge," but contends that, by and large, these attempts to influence decisions will prove futile, for a judge of integrity, if he has
an inkling of what is going on, will transfer the case to another.
To inquiring laymen who are puzzled by the formalities of the courtroom and desirous of a better understanding of the intricacies of a trial,
without being bored, and to judges and lawyers who have the wellbeing of the profession at heart, this autobiographical contribution by
Justin Botein will prove both entertaining and instructive. The author
has addressed himself to the task of surveying trial procedure, functions of jurors, trial conduct of lawyers, necessary qualifications of
competent judges, the relationship between bench and bar and the
many overlapping phases of such subject matter.
He makes no parade of erudition but speaks simply and convincingly,
exhibiting keen perception and technical skill without over-simplication. His style is matter-of-fact, lawyer-like, impressing the reader with
his genuineness and sincerity. His story is not only true, it is illuminated by his pertinent comments.
All in all the book is a striking, refreshing story of a judge's life
from his boyhood, telling briefly of his practice and more fully of his
experience as a trial judge. No startling novelty of style meets the
reader's eye, but there is evident a skill in relating specific incidents
to underlying principles. The recommendations made are thoughtprovoking and for the most part convincing. The author offers little
with which to quarrel, for his conclusions are reflections upon important themes by a gifted lawyer and an experienced judge, exhibiting a talent for capable judicial work. He deals in a diverting manner,
comprehensively but concisely, with his various theses. His factual
material is chosen for its human interest; thus, his beguiling stories
of lawyers and of incidents in tense trials enable the reader to envision
well defined portraits of such types as the "snarling old warrior,"
the "bull-throated battler" and the "smart-quipping witness."
He essays the difficult task of a vivid presentation of the infinite
facets of life which confront the trial judge, facing his undertaking
with an obviously earnest purpose and flavoring his factual statements with that redeeming sense of humor which has saved many a
soul on the bench and at the bar. He uses a big word now and then, but,
in the main, his presentation is simple and direct, assuring one of his
sincerity, his capacity, his understanding of the important job of an
American trial judge, in such a manner as to repay well the reader,
whether lawyer or layman.
WALTER C. LINDLEY"

* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, since

1949; Judge, Eastern District of Illinois, 1922-1949.
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PAPERs AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND. Col-

lected and with Introduction and Notes by Irving Dilliard. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1952. Pp. xxx, 262. $3.50.
Irving Dilliard of the St. Louis Post-Dispatchhas earned the admiration of lawyers, laymen and students alike by making available within
the confines of a slender volume the addresses and papers of Judge
Learned Hand. For many years lawyers and judges have read Judge
Hand's judicial opinions with respect for the incisive mind that cuts
so cleanly to the heart of a legal problem and admiration for the magnificently clear and precise style that elevates his judicial pronouncements into the realm of belles lettres. Now lawyer and layman alike
may read the unofficial thoughts of one of the most balanced and
civilized minds of the age on such grave subjects as the proper limits
of judicial discretion, the bases and meaning of liberty, the presumptions and realities of democracy and the preservation of personality.
Learned Hand stands among the great judges of the Anglo-American
legal tradition. He is preeminently the judge's judge, the lawyer's
lawyer. His long judicial career spanning one of the crucial periods
in the development of American law and his long service on the bench
in a circuit where some of the most vexing and complex legal issues
come into final focus peculiarly fit him for the task of explaining the
judge's function in the American system of law and the court's place
in our jural order. Judge Hand has explained his view of the proper
limits of judicial discretion in a few brief essays and speeches which
Mr. Irving Dilliard has happily brought together in his volume.
It is Judge Hand's view that the judge should be, in the words of
Sir Frederick Pollock, both "valorous" and "cautious" -valorous in
dispensing with technical difficulties and in overriding what is merely
a show of authority on the part of current opinion and cautious in making advances which have not become generally acceptable. He would
rather strictly limit the judicial function although he recognizes the
necessity for a degree of judicial legislation. To Learned Hand the
price the judiciary must pay for independence and continued prestige
today is abstention from engaging in the policy struggles that are better solved by an assembly of the people where the competing interests
may reach delicate but mutually acceptable compromises. He feels
that the judge is at his creative best in the realm of the common law
where he may gently mould the law to conform to emerging social
needs by compromising inconsistencies, unravelling confusions and
making, in Holmes' phrase, "interstitial advances." In interpreting
statutes he is no member of the "Dictionary School" but rather believes that the judge should seek to realize in the application of the law
its underlying purpose or objective. With this in mind he advocates
a judicious use of legislative history.
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In the realm of constitutional law Judge Hand enunciates an interesting and only partially accepted technique of interpretation. Since
constitutions deal in generalities and only roughly map the terrain, he
feels that an independent judiciary is justified in adapting the instrument to the needs of a dynamic social order, witness, for instance, the
judicial development of the commerce clause. With the Bill of Rights,
however, the same judicial freedom can not be admitted; for Hand
considers the Bill of Rights to be not law in the strict sense but
rather as precautionary warnings against the spirit of faction and intemperance; not eternal verities but rather the historical monuments
of a victorious struggle. Since in this area interpretation necessarily
involves a choice between competing value judgments, he thinks that
courts should be extremely chary of overturning legislative interpretations. How can a judge be sure that his own calculus of values is
superior to that dictated by the only general or common will that
exists.
The book would be valuable for the abbreviated but acute discussion
of the judicial function alone. Happily, it contains other essays as
penetrating as they are polished and poised. In addition it offers short
judicial character sketches of men like Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo and
Stone. Brief though they are, they light up the subject completely.
They are like the split-second revelations of a powerful searchlight
and as such are more revealing than a thousand grubby candles.
The book should be required reading for law students. Many judges
could spend time to better advantage on this little book than on the
more ponderous but far less provocative and penetrating commentaries on the law. I do not predict that it will become bedside reading
for college coeds. I can almost wish it were so.
Robert S. Lancaster*

Ali cAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, A GENEiAL VIEw. By Herman Clarence Nixon. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952. Pp. x, 476. $4.00.
Professor Nixon writes that government "has been the cause and
subject of much work, fighting, talk and writing. It still is." In the
past Professor Nixon has been responsible for a goodly share of the
"work, fighting, talk and writing." And he still is. Students of American
government would be extremely fortunate if all the writing were done
as lucidly, cogently and carefully as is Professor Nixon's. The essentials
of government in general and of American government in particular
are clearly and accurately portrayed in American Federal Government.
Moreover, Professor Nixon in his -own inimitable style evades the
*Professor of Political Science, University of the South.
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ponderousness characteristic of so much textbook writing. Knowing
Professor Nixon, a reader might wish that he had been less careful
to delete himself from the text. Yet typical "Nixonisms" are discernible
throughout and spice his "general view" of American federal government.
The George Price cartoon (reproduced from The New Yorker) depicting an occupied voting booth with a coin being flipped into the air
above it tells as much about voting in these United States as could
be told in pages and in a fashion calculated to catch the interest of
the beginning student. The observation that "'tweedledum and tweedledee' in the main is what the public wants" in its political parties is
a way of making a point which will enhance the chances for its recall.
"A majority of the voters of America display middle-class leanings
and find regular or irregular accommodations in the adaptable households of the two large middle-ground parties." Much sound political
analysis is packed into the brief compass of sentences such as this one.
Astute capitalization of our American sporting turn is evident in
statements such as the following. The general election "is the climax
in the 'great game of politics,' and it requires an extensive system of
rules, refereeing, and score-keeping." "New York state, with one-tenth
of the nation's population, has no more voice in the upper house [of
Congress]than Nevada's population, which could be almost crowded
into the Rose Bowl."
The twist which prompted selection of such titles as Possum Trot
and Forty Acres and Steel Mules for earlier books is recurrent. "The
substantial use of money," says Professor Nixon, "seems as necessary
in national elections under modern conditions as in the purchase of
groceries." Again, "The bench and bar are associated as vital parts of
one system like bacon and eggs in a breakfast meal." Somewhat similar
is the statement that "An able President mixes and times application
of these different influences [over legislative policy-making] with the
skill of a competent chef reaching for ingredients to execute a good
recipe."
Professor Nixon uses the "pictures in our minds" to good advantage
in well-chosen figures which might be exemplified by the term "grist
for the mills of politics" or the comment that "our national house of
government could not be cited as a good example of functional architecture." Congressional investigative powers are justified simply by the
homely observation that "Congress can not pull laws and policies out of
a hat without regard to facts." Some of our Congressmen would do
well, incidentally, to read Professor Nixon's mildly chiding comment
that congressional investigations "sometimes partake of rank partisanship and publicity-seeking, causing embarrassment to citizens without
cause or necessity."
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One of the great strengths of this book is the constructively critical
approach of Professor Nixon. He observes that "there is point to the
wise-crack that we fought World War II 'in triplicate.'" Yet, "one
might say of government that eternal vigilance is the price of efficiency as well as of liberty." He makes the point that if Congressmen
and the public fully realized the difference between the present and
initial roles of Congress, executive-legislative relations would be more
improved than they would by any "reform in the organization or
procedure of the House and Senate." Again, he says that "if able experts are to 'be on tap, not on top' in a political democracy, there must
be an educated and articulate citizenry." If all read and followed the
sage counsel embodied in Professor Nixon's concluding chapter, "You
and Your Government," we would be a better educated and more
articulate citizenry.
Professor Nixon's appraisal of congressional party machinery is
realistically critical. He recognizes that "there must be leadership...
in the House of 435 Representatives, who cannot lead themselves,
except perhaps into chaos" and avers that the "answer to the imperfections of party roles in the national legislature lies not so much
in abolishing those roles as in increasing the sense of responsibility and
democratic control within the parties themselves." In answering his
question of how and how well Congress, "as an organized representative body," exercises its powers, fulfills its functions, and meets its
problems, Professor Nixon takes a "critical look" at Congress at work.
The pattern of that "critical look" is set by observations which
characterize his approach to American government in general. It is
noteworthy. "The critical look should be tempered," says Professor
Nixon, "with a realistic caution against expecting perfection of a
human institution which is inherently and inevitably political. Congress must be appraised as a part of, not apart from, American society."
When the writer recounts reform accomplishments, he points to
distances yet to be travelled. Commenting upon the changed nature of
our Foreign Service personnel, for example, he notes nonetheless
that "there is still occasional criticism of elite 'cookie pushers' in the
diplomatic service abroad and complaints of their being more sophisticated in the ways of foreign high society than in the realities of
American foreign policy." Professor Nixon perceives a tendency on
the part of the processes of government "to attain essential unity at the
point of contact with citizens," a blurring of public consciousness of
three branches of government and the "border lines between state and
national government."
Professor Nixon recognizes the inappropriateness of some of our
favorite and most "seductive" cliches. One modification is the statement that "we have a government both of laws and of men." Lest this
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quotation out of context do injustice to Professor Nixon, it may be
balanced by another: "American government changes and expands
through change and expansion of law. The idea of law endures."
The author takes cognizance of the ambiguity inherent in our use
of one term in several senses and several terms in the same sense.
An illustration is the word "federal" which we use in more than
one sense, one being a designation of the central government. It vies
in that capacity with "national" and "United States." We have a
National Bureau of Standards, a United States Civil Service Commission and a Federal Bureau of Investigation. He warns that one
"must not look for logical consistency in the use of these descriptive
terms, either in official publications or in this text." Lest the word
"federal" in the title of his book be misinterpreted, it might be noted
that four chapters in American Federal Government are devoted to
state and local government. Moreover, Professor Nixon throughout
his text has interrelated the three levels of national, state and local
government in a fashion admirably suited to furnish the reader with a
sound understanding of the "essential unity" in the processes of government with which he comes in contact.
All in all, American Federal Government is a sound, factual treatment with emphasis upon the functional approach to government but
due attention accorded also to structure. It is short enough to be
easily manageable for a one-quarter or one-semester course. Yet, it
can be supplemented with collateral documentary and illustrative
materials for use in a one-year course. The author has achieved his
aim in writing a text which "lends itself to a flexibility of usage for
courses differing in number of weeks or credit hours." Yet, it embraces
all the essentials of American government. The format is pleasant,
the marginal paragraph headings helpful, the print of an easily legible
type and printing errors at a minimum.
In conclusion we might adapt to his book a statement made by
Professor Nixon with respect to the United States Constitution: "It is
easy to read. Read it."
* Associate
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